OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION AND PRICING IN THE CEMENT MARKET: A MODERN INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

This article explores how Kazakhstan’s cement market operates under conditions of oligopolistic competition. In the introduction, the cement industry is presented as a strategically important sector of the economy, where high capital requirements and transport costs limit market entry and shape competitive behavior. The materials and methods are based on combining classical oligopoly theory with an empirical analysis of 2023–2024 data on cement production, consumption, prices, imports, exports, and capacity utilization, complemented by comparisons with foreign cement markets. The results and discussion show that the market is strongly regionally segmented, operates with moderate capacity utilization of around 60.5%, and demonstrates relatively stable pricing with an average annual increase of about 4%. Producers tend to avoid sharp changes in output, which is largely consistent with Cournot-type competition, while in certain regions the behavior of dominant firms reflects elements of Stackelberg leadership. In the conclusions, it is argued that Kazakhstan’s cement industry continues to display pronounced oligopolistic characteristics driven by cost structure, logistics, and strategic interaction among firms, and the conclusion confirms that classical oligopoly models remain a useful tool for explaining pricing and output decisions in this market.

Key words: Kazakhstan, cement market, oligopoly, pricing strategies, Cournot model, Stackelberg model, building material